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ADVANCED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONTRACT
John Linarelli

Conjectures are of great importance since they suggest useful lines of research. – Alan Turing1

Abstract
The aim of this article is to inquire whether contract law can operate in a state
of affairs in which artificial general intelligence (AGI) exists and has the cognitive abilities to interact with humans to exchange promises or otherwise engage in the sorts of exchanges typically governed by contract law. AGI is a
long way off but its emergence may be sudden and come in the lifetimes of
some people alive today. How might contract law adapt to a situation in which
at least one of the contract parties could, from the standpoint of capacity to
engage in promising and exchange, be an AGI? This is not a situation in which
AI operates as an agent of a human or a firm, a frequent occurrence right now.
Rather, the question is whether an AGI could constitute a principal – a contract
party on its own. Contract law is a good place to start a discussion about adapting the law for an AGI future because it already incorporates a version of what
is known as weak AI in its objective standard for contract formation and interpretation. Contract law in some limited sense takes on issues of relevance from
philosophy of mind. AGI holds the potential to transform a solution to an epistemological problem of how to prove a contract exists into solution to an ontological problem about the capacity to contract. An objection might be that contract law presupposes the existence of a person the law recognizes as possessing the capacity to contract. Contract law itself may not be able to answer
the prior question of legally recognized personhood. The answer will be to focus on how AGI cognitive architecture could be designed for compatibility for
human interaction. This article focuses on that question as well.

INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) will bring about the next big change in the law. It will compel us to reconsider who or what will be the subjects upon which the law imposes duties,
confers powers, and allocates rights. AI already challenges the allocation of legal duties, powers, and rights to persons already recognized as subjects of the law. But the
challenge to-date has been incremental. The next big change will be transformational.
It will be more significant than the legal recognition of the limited liability firm, the last
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great move in legal systems to alter who (or more precisely what) gets legal rights and
bears liabilities.2 An artificial person with limited liability such as a corporation still
must operate through human agents,3 though American law may permit an automated
system to operate but not create a member-less limited liability company.4 A sufficiently advanced AI, a so-called artificial general intelligence (AGI) will not need to
operate through agents. In the study of the history of science we are admonished to
avoid extending Thomas Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm shift beyond its intended purposes.5 It may be no exaggeration to apply the notion of the paradigm shift here to argue
that the next big change in the law to accommodate AGI will not be normal legal
change.
We do not know where advances in AI are headed. AGI does not yet exist. AI currently falls short of human capabilities generally though AI already outperforms human
intelligence in many specific domains.6 The Stanford study, Artificial Intelligence and
Life in 2030, states that to date, “no machines with self-sustaining long-term goals and
intent have been developed, nor are they likely to be developed in the near future.”7 But
AGI will come to exist in the future. Claims that AGI could never exist are implausible.
To base predictions on the current state of AI technology would not be rational. To hold
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predictions hostage to some presupposed uniqueness of human understanding or consciousness is unsupportable.8 Nick Bostrom tentatively predicts the existence of human
level AI by mid-century and soon thereafter a super-AI vastly exceeding the cognitive
abilities of humans.9
And we do not know of the progress AI itself will make in advancing towards AGI.
It is possible that the basic components of AI cognitive architecture (code or otherwise)
will become something roughly analogous to “gene” and AI evolution will occur independently of the initial human intervention of AI creation, if humans engineer such
evolution to be possible. Machine learning already accomplishes this in limited domains.10
The aim of this article is to assess the feasibility of investing an AGI, from a legal
point of view, with the power to enter into contracts, either with humans or with other
AGIs. The argument made in this article is that an AGI can be a party to a contract. It
can be legally obligated for promises it makes in contracts, have and enforce rights as
a matter of contract, and bear contractual liabilities. Part of the answer rests on contract
law itself and part rests on the need to design AGI cognition to be compatible with the

8

A longstanding disagreement in philosophy of mind is between those who argue that AI, or at least
what is known as strong AI, is impossible. Strong AI is AI that actually thinks, is conscious, has a phenomenology of the particular experiences of life, and has the properties of intentionality that humans
have. Weak AI is AI that acts as if it is thinking, conscious, and acting with intentionality. See STUART
RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 1020-1033 (3d ed.
2010)(overview). While staking out a middle ground David Chalmers offers a good summary of the
arguments. DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH 6OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY 313332 (1996). This is an argument about whether AI must have some form of inner life, some phenomenology of conscious experience, or true understanding or whether a simulation of these things will suffice, is beyond our scope here. This article rests on the argument that weak AI is sufficient for contracting
and so no need exists to engage in this debate. AI researchers take a similar view and go further, arguing
that philosophers are asking the wrong questions that are too open ended for science. The argue, for
example, that asking whether AI has consciousness is akin to asking if aircraft can fly because they are
not birds or asking whether submarines can swim because they are not fish. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra,
at 1021.
9
BOSTROM, supra note xx, at 24-25.
10
See supra note xx and accompanying text.
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requirements of contract law and the properties of exchange in social and market contexts.
At the outset, distinguish contracts with and by AGIs from smart contracts. This
article does not deal with smart contracting. The term “smart contract” is ambiguous.11
It is not a legal concept. Very simply, a smart contract is a contract (a legally enforceable agreement) for which some or all contract performance is executed and enforced
digitally and without the need for human intervention except at the level of writing code
to automate contract performance.12 Distributed ledger technology has advanced substantially the ability of contract parties to write and use smart contracts. The combination of the distributed ledger, the network, and the consensus mechanisms built into
distributed ledger technology facilitate trust between contract parties and replace humans in institutions operating as intermediaries.13 In short, smart contracts substitute
algorithmic for human contract performance and enforcement. The next-generation
conceptualization of smart contracts might be as “algorithmic” contracts in which algorithms operate constructively as agents for humans.14 A more general notion is Scott
Bayern’s process-agreement equivalence principle: “at least as a matter of conceptual
logic, a legally enforceable agreement may give legal significance to arbitrary features
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Harry Surden has developed a typology to clarify the evolution and categories of smart contracting.
He classifies the evolution of digitized agreements, starting with online contracts, moving to data-oriented contracts that specify obligations in code, and then on to computable contracts that assess contract
performance and produce consequences. Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
629, 631-42 (2012). He developed this typology before the rise of blockchain. Kevin Werbach & Nicholas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L. J. 101, 108-112 (2017).
12
Various authors have offered definitions of a smart contract. Nick Szabo is credited with inventing the
phrase. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 9 at 107. Szabo defines a smart contract as a “set of promises,
specified in digital form, including protocols within which the parties perform on these promises.” Nick
Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets (1996), available at
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh net/smart_contracts_2 html (accessed Feb. 7, 2019). Max Raskin describes
smart contracts as “agreements wherein execution is automated, usually by computers.” Max Raskin,
The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 306 (2017); Werbach & Cornell
define a smart contract as an “agreement in digital form that is self-executing and self-enforcing.” Werbach & Cornell, supra note xx at 108.
13
Werbach & Cornell, supra note xx at 118.
14
Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128 (2017).
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of the state of any process (such as an algorithm or physical system) by specifying legal
conditions satisfied by features of that state.”15
Smart contracts are in widespread use now and their use is increasing. An example
of a smart contract is Fizzy, the automated flight delay insurance system used by the
French airline AXA, running on the Ethereum blockchain. Fizzy allows passengers to
be indemnified for late fight arrivals as soon as they arrive at their destination. Passengers need do nothing other than buy the insurance on the AXA app. With Fizzy, if a
flight is more than two hours late, the passenger will receive an automatic notification
with compensation options. The code sends the compensation directly to the bank or
credit card the customer has chosen.16 Compare the Fizzy smart contract with the
“dumb” contracts that train operators use in the United Kingdom.17 In the United Kingdom, the typical terms of the franchise by government to train operators requires the
train operator to adhere to a passengers’ charter mandating passenger compensation for
some train delays, depending on cause and duration. To claim compensation, passengers
must enter details online along with a readable scan of their paper tickets or mail the
tickets along with a form completed by hand. Train operators promise compensation in
28 days. Train passengers must endure this process even though the train operators have
in their computer systems all the information they need about passengers and delays.
The difference between contracting with or by an AGI and smart (or algorithmic)
contracts is that humans or legal persons in the form of entities such as corporations are
the actual parties to smart contracts, whereas contracts with AGIs involve at least one
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Bayern, supra note xx, at 300; Bayern, Burri et al., supra note 2, at 136. On the limits of smart contracts, see Werbach & Cornell, supra note xx; Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of
Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (2017).
16
AXA Goes Blockchain with Fizzy, https://www.axa.com/en/newsroom/news/axa-goes-blockchainwith-fizzy (accessed Feb. 8, 2019).
17
See, e.g., Great Western Railway, Passenger’s Charter, https://www.gwr.com/about-us/our-business/passengers-charter (accessed Feb. 8, 2019). See also Jeffrey Lipshaw. The Persistence of “Dumb”
Contracts, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 1 (2019).
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contract party that is neither a human nor a currently recognized legal person such as a
corporation, limited liability company, or partnership. This difference is fundamental.
This article examines what it might mean for contract law when AI is sufficiently advanced that it could have the capacity, in a cognitive sense, to make and perform contracts.
This article is organized as follows. Part I examines how contract law, already at
least partly and with some adaptation, has answered the question of how to treat an AGI
as a contract party. The objective theory of contract, prevalent in American and English
common law, informs us that in determining whether a contract came into existence
and what its terms might be, courts do not inquire whether persons in their minds actually possessed intent to be bound in contract, but look to external evidence in the form
of an outward manifestation of assent by words, behavior, and action. The objective
theory coincides closely to the Turing test for assessing whether an AI exists. The Turing test requires an evaluator to evaluate text-based communications between a human
and a machine and if the evaluator cannot reliably predict who is human and what is
machine, then the machine has passed the test. The subjective-objective debate in the
common law of contract, long settled in favor of the objective standard, reflects with
remarkable consistency debates among philosophers and AI researchers on how to assess intentions of AI and test whether AI could plausibly have consciousness. That the
objective theory of contract may be meant to deal with an epistemological problem, that
of determining whether a contract has come into existence, and not an ontological problem, that of determining whether the actors who are attempting to contract are eligible
as persons to be bound by the law, does not pose an obstacle to using the theory to
support recognition of an AGI as a contract party. Part II addresses how to design an
AGI to allow it to interact with humans in the domain of contract. This is a question of
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how to code the cognitive architecture of AGI. Part II does not argue that AI researchers
must replicate or copy humans for the sake of doing so, if that will ever be possible.
Rather, the focus should be on interactivity and cognition associated with transacting
and exchange. Because contract law evolved as a social institution to enforce group
norms for humans and reflects normative concepts found in human cognition, any AGI,
to form contracts with humans, will have to possess some cognitive adaptations that
support exchange-level interactions of a contractual kind with humans. Developing
AGIs as contractors is a demanding task, and while the investigation of these questions
is speculative at this point, it might be an eminently practical sooner than we think.

I. THE TURING TEST ALREADY IN CONTRACT LAW
In his 1950 article, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Turing starts by stating his
question as “can machines think?”18 He eventually finds this question “too meaningless
to deserve discussion”19 and replaces it with “are there any imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?”20 The imitation game proceeds as
follows. The players in the game are a human being and a machine. The game also
includes a human interrogator. The interrogator is in a separate room from the human
and the machine. The interrogator knows the others are labelled X and Y, knows one is
human and the other machine, but does not know which. The object of the game is to
test whether the interrogator can tell the difference between the human and the machine
though a series of questions. The interrogator is to ask questions to the machine and the
individual through a text channel to avoid revealing which is the human and which the
machine. If the interrogator cannot reliably distinguish the human from the machine,

18

Turing, supra note 1.
Id., 442.
20
Id.
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then the machine passes the test. The test is meant to assess whether a machine can give
answers that consistently resemble those a human would give such that humans cannot
tell the machine apart from a human, in terms of the cognitive performance of the machine.21
There has been much debate about what the Turing test tells us. Turing offered his
test at a time when behaviorism was ascendant in psychology, and cognitive science, a
field closely aligned with artificial intelligence and focusing on mental representations
and not only on behavior, was only beginning to emerge as a field of study.22 Gilbert
Ryle’s, The Concept of Mind, a thorough rejection of Cartesian dualism, was published
a year before Turing’s paper.23 While Ryle said that his work was limited to rejecting
mind-body dualism as it is understood in philosophy, he did point out that a methodological problem with psychology before behaviorism was that “the reputed deliverances
of consciousness and introspection are not publicly checkable.”24
AI definitions vary based on whether to focus on behavior and action or on whether
machines actually think.25 Turing focused on the former. His test is now understood as
a way to look for “weak AI,” enough for classifying a machine as an AI if the machine
can act as if it is thinking and has intentionality.26 Distinguish strong AI: for a machine
to qualify as intelligent in a strong AI sense, it actually has to think and have actual
intentions associated with its actions and not just simulate thinking and intentions.27 In

21

See Stevan Harnad, The Turing Test Is Not A Trick: Turing Indistinguishability Is A Scientific Criterion, 3 SIGART BULLETIN 9 (1992).
22
The first academic gathering that got cognitive science as a discipline started was the Hixon symposium, “Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior,” held at the California Institute of Technology in 1948. HOWARD GARDNER, THE MIND’S NEW SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION 10 (1985).
23
GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949).
24
Id., 327.
25
Russell & Norvig, supra note xx, at 1, 1020. See also note __ and accompanying text.
26
Russell & Norvig, supra note xx, at 1, 1020; WENDALL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 74-75 (2010).
27
Russell & Norvig, supra note xx, at 1026-27; Wallach & Allen, supra note xx, at 74-75; John Searle,
Minds, Brains, and Programs, 3 THE BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES 417 (1980).
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other words, strong AI posits the notion that a machine has a “mind” that can understand and have mental states just like humans. AI researchers do not care about these
distinctions and accept weak AI as sufficient to determine whether machine intelligence
can be classified as AI.28
Weak AI is sufficient for purposes of determining whether an AGI could be a party
to a contract, in terms of understanding the question as one internal to contract law. The
Turing test has been effectively embedded into Anglo-American contract law, in the
objective theory of contract.29 The focus of this tradition in contract law is on outward
appearances – on what can be proven as a matter of evidence independent of the mental
states the parties may or may not have. The objective theory of contract tells us that
intention to be bound to or form a contract is determined by evidence external to the
actual intentions of the parties. Judge Learned Hand has said:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the
mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were
proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes
upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.30
Judge Frank Easterbrook has explained that intention to be bound “does not invite a
tour through [a contract party’s] cranium” but must necessarily be derived from a consideration of the words, written and oral, and actions of the part parties.31 Often quoted

28

Russell & Norvig, supra note xx, at 1020. Searle, widely known as an avid critic of the notion of the
possibility of AI, seems only to object to the possibility of strong AI. Searle, supra note xx, at 417.
29
See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contact Formation and Interpretation,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000); Timothy A. O. Endicott, Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Incomplete
Agreements, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE FOURTH SERIES 151 (Jeremey Horder ed., 2000).
30
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912),
aff’d, 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
31
Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987).
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on the objective theory of contract formation and interpretation is the New Hampshire
Supreme Court, itself quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.:
A contract involves what is called a meeting of the minds of the parties.
But this does not mean that they must have arrived at a common mental
state touching the matter at hand. The standard by which their conduct
is judged and their rights are limited are not internal but external. In the
absence of fraud or incapacity, the question is: What did the party say
and do? “The making of a contract does not depend upon the state of the
parties’ minds; it depends upon their overt acts.”32
The U.S. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, intended to reflect a consensus about
contract law in the United States, does not contain any section explicitly titled on intention to form a contract. It advises us that American contract law has likely abolished
the idea of intention to be legally bound. Restatement (Second) section 21 provides that
“neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the
formation of a contract. . . .”33 American contract law instead relies on what is known
in American law as manifestation of mutual assent, which requires each party either to
promise, objectively understood, or perform.34 While English law does not reflect this
Restatement (Second) language of manifestation of mutual assent, it is substantially
similar in adhering to an objective theory of contract formation and interpretation.35 In
English law, intention to create legal relations is traditionally only used to distinguish
promises the parties want the law to enforce and promises they do not want the law to
enforce.

32

Woburn National Bank v Woods, 77 N.H. 172, 89 A 491, 492 (1914)(citation omitted), quoting OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 307 (1881).
33
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §21 (1981).
34
Id., §18. The “manifestation” language is pervasive in American contract law and reflects the notion
of contracting making sense only in the form or external representations to other persons. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §2 (1981), which defines core concepts such as a promise as “a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made.” Comment b explains that a manifestation of intention
is an “external expression” as opposed to “undisclosed intention.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §2
cmt. b (1981).
35
Endicott, supra note xx; EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT 1 (14th ed., 2015)(§1-002,
‘The objective principle”)..
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No “Chinese room” problem confronts the thin version of intentionality in American and English contract law. The philosopher John Searle posed the Chinese room
problem, a thought experiment36 to argue that strong AI is impossible. In summary form
the Chinese room problem proceeds as follows. Imagine yourself alone in a room following a set of rules in English, a language you understand, responding to Mandarin
Chinese characters slipped under the door. You understand no Mandarin, but you are
following the rules provided to you, analogous to a computer program, to produce appropriate responses in the form of Mandarin Chinese characters to questions posed in
Mandarin Chinese to you under the door. You can do this to an adequate level of proficiency that you fool the person on the other side of the door into believing that you
actually know Mandarin Chinese. The thought experiment is designed to show that programming a machine might make the machine appear to understand a language, but it
does not actually understand the language. Searle argues that the thought experiment
illustrates that computers only use syntactic rules to manipulate symbol strings but have
no understanding of the meaning or semantics of those symbols.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the Chinese room problem that go far beyond our scope here.37 For our purposes the Chinese room problem is useful in helping
us understand why weak AI just might be enough for contract formation and interpretation. Think about how the common law of contract does not recognize a “secret” intent to form a contract or not to form a contract, or for a particular provision to be or
not to be in a contract. Contract law does not make mental states or “mind” relevant.
Simulating “real” intent does not matter to contract law. Analogizing to the Chinese

36

On the use of thought experiments in philosophy see Kimberly Brownlee & Zofia Stemplowska,
Thought Experiments, in METHODS IN ANALYTICAL POLITICAL THEORY 21 (Adran Blau ed., 2017)
37
For an extended discussion, see David Cole, The Chinese Room Problem, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/#toc
(last visited Feb. 16, 2019).

~ 11 ~

room thought experiment, the symbols that come out of the room matter for contracting,
regardless of how they are produced. The semantics of contract terms does not rely on
any “true” understanding, in terms of what the parties actually mean, but only what
their actions or outward appearances convey what they mean. This is weak AI. The law
of contracts only recognizes weak forms of intelligence, natural or artificial. Simulated
or real, whatever that may mean in the study of consciousness and the mind, are simply
irrelevant to contract law.
The argument for recognition of AGI as a potential contracting party using the objective theory of contract is not an extension of objective theory beyond its purposes.
A possible objection to the argument, which would ultimately prove unsuccessful,
might proceed along the following lines. The objective theory of contract is meant to
be epistemological and not ontological. Objectivity in contract law is meant to solve
problems of proof and evidence. It is about providing tractable means by which to prove
to a fact-finder (a judge or a jury) whether the parties formed a contract and on what
terms.38 My argument, so the objection goes, attempts to answer a prior question, about
the nature of the contract parties themselves, about who can be said to qualify by law
to form an intent in the first place. These questions will be taken up in part II below in
a more policy-oriented sense, but this part will address it from the internal perspective
of the objective theory of contract itself.
The objective theory of contract is more than about what one can prove in court. It
is not a set of propositions from the law of evidence but a set of propositions about the
concepts or properties of contract. Objectivity goes to a claim that differs from how to
prove. It goes to whether a contract exists, or not. Nothing about contract law is first
person or phenomenological. Its doctrines are functional. Contract law does not care

38

See Perillo, supra note xx.
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about the nature of the cognitive systems of a contracting party but how they function.
If an intelligence is capable of manifesting to the external world that it can promise,
bargain, and discharge contractual rights and obligations, then its outward appearances
in the form of objective evidence is not subject to refutation, as a matter of contract
law.39
We see the focus on function in the law on capacity to contract. Relying on existing law risks anthropocentrism and setting an inappropriate standard, but given law’s
emphasis on text, tradition, and precedent, let us give it a go.
Preliminarily, avoid tautologies. It is true that capacity to contract can exist because
the law makes it so. To rely on such a claim would be an exercise in empty formalism.
It is equivalent to saying p because p. A stipulative approach works for delimiting capacity as it relates to the age of individuals and to artificial persons such as corporations.
These persons derive their capacity to contract through statute or well-settled common
law principles.40 Circular reasoning will not solve the problem. It may come to pass that
AGI does receive statutory or even case law recognition as a person, but such recognition usually hinges on some deeper need or justification and that is what we explore
here.
The law on contractual capacity of natural persons does not depend on the “nature”
or qualities of the person who is the contracting party, and so it is at best unclear why
it should do so for AGI. There is scant recent common law on capacity and the subject

39

See supra note xx. Very crudely, contract law could be said to support or be consistent with a functionalist philosophy of mind. There are many approaches to functionalism, and it is hazardous to generalize. The gist of functionalism is this: a mental state does not depend on its internal composition but on
how it functions or the role it plays for agents. It does not matter whether the actual stuff making these
functions happen is a biological brain of a primate or the silicon chips of a computer. For a prominent
version of functionalism, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED (1991); DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE (1989).
40
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §12 cmt. e (1981); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & ZACHARY WOLFE,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 220-27 (4th ed., 2018); ANDREW BURROUGHS, A RESTATEMENT OF THE
ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT 34 (2016).

~ 13 ~

is covered very briefly here. American Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 15,
entitled “Mental Illness or Defect,” is illustrative. It provides that a person with a mental
illness or defect lacks the capacity to contract and incurs only voidable contractual duties if she or he cannot “understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences
of the transaction” or cannot “act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction
and the other party has reason to know of his condition.”41 Moreover, when the contract
is fair in its terms and the other party does not know of the mental illness or defect of
the other party, the power of avoidance terminates to the extent the contract is performed or avoidance would be unjust because of changed circumstances.42 Comment c
to Section 15 explains that to prove incapacity it is essential to prove “irrational or
unintelligent behavior” and that “almost any conduct of the person may be relevant.”43
These Restatement provisions illustrate that the law on incapacity to contract, consistently with the objective theory of contract, embeds a Turing-like test in its terms. They
illustrate how contact law relies only on the external appearance of capacity.44 The person whose capacity is in issue must be unable to understand or act “in a reasonable
manner” to put the other party on notice of the incapacity. It removes the availability
of the incapacity defense in situations in which the other party does not know the incapacity and the contract is basically fair and already performed. There is no mental statetype of evaluation because such an approach has no place in contract law. Capacity has
to do, at least partly, with the manifestation of assent to contract, which, as explained

41
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above, is determined through observable behavior and action. The appearance of assent
to the other party can be determinative in any case in which incapacity is asserted as a
defense.
In summary, nothing in contact law itself prevents an AGI from being a party to a
contract. To the contrary, contract law supports AGI recognition as a contracting party.
Of course, many practical difficulties will arise in cases in in which an AGI will purport
to be a party to a contract but from the standpoint of contract law itself, any difficulties
can be overcome. Putting doctrine into practice is often more difficult than conceptualizing how the law would address a particular social problem in theory.

II. AGIS AS BEARERS OF CONTRACT RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
As explained above, a possible objection to the above argument for AGI capacity
or eligibility as a contract party is that it is question begging or at the very least sets
overly narrow parameters by focusing only on contract law and not on the necessary
conditions for contract law to operate in the first place. The prior question, so the argument goes, is not about contract but about status, about the status of AGI as persons.
Before we begin to talk about contracting by AGIs, we need to resolve whether an AGI
is entitled to status or recognition as a person under the law. The preceding discussion
assumes there is a candidate or subject who (or which) can have capacity to contract.
This part will take up these broader and more policy-oriented questions. The focus will
be on subjects who can possess contract rights and bear contract liability.
At the outset, rule out “artefact” arguments against recognition of AGI as subjects
of the law.45 That an AGI is not a natural person tells us nothing about legal status other
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than that the law should not recognize an AGI as a natural person. That an AGI is not
a natural person in the form of a human does not lead to the conclusion that it is to have
no legal status at all. The law recognizes many kinds of persons that are not natural
persons. Humans create other persons with no biology but with legal recognition, such
as corporations. Biology is an arbitrary feature that cannot pick out the necessary conditions for personhood. In the future, some AGI may be biological in at least some or
even its main features and humans may incorporate elements of machine intelligence
into their brains and bodies.46
That an AGI is created by humans does not lead to the conclusion that an AGI
should have no legal status as a person under the law or subject to the law. Several
defects are apparent in this “creation” argument. Humans are created by humans too.
The theological argument that humans are created by God cannot work. The proximate
creators of humans are other humans at the present time though this may change.47
AGIs are also created by God because everything is ultimately God’s creation, if one
accepts the teachings of mainstream religions. AGIs, moreover, will probably be able
to create other AGIs in the future, as this is what being a general domain AI may entail.
That AI is “coded” in the sense that their intelligence may derive from a form of
programming does not matter either for purposes of legal recognition of the status of
AGI as subjects to which the law makes authoritative pronouncements. Theory and
evidence about evolution informs us that humans are coded too.48 The “technology” or
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source of intelligence or intentionality should not be determinative of legal status or
recognition.
But there is a human constraint on AGI recognition as a person for purposes of
contract law. The constraint is not special to contract law, but contract law adds special
elements to it. It derives from the proposition that law is what anthropologist Michael
Tomasello characterizes as a “conventional cultural practice” that has evolved through
time to reflect and enforce group social norms of a special kind.49 For the law to be
applied to both humans and AGI on terms of equal respect for each, AGIs will have to
possess or be able to simulate a collective intentionality that so far has been special to
humans.50 In broad strokes and with some adaptation the argument proceeds as follows.
Collective intentionality is necessary for the existence of conventional cultural practices
such as law.51 Law does not simply operate on human cognition; it is also created by
it.52 Humans have evolved so that their cognition includes substantial elements of
group-mindedness and pro-sociality.53 These features of human cognition gave humans
the ability to construct cultures common in their groups through conventions that include social norms and institutions such as law.54 Contract law, money, social norms
on what constitutes fair exchange and the psychology of markets all play a role. It will
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be difficult for AGI to engage in contracting or to be subject to contract law if it cannot
interact with humans as humans have evolved to interact and to be regulated by institutions humans have constructed to reflect the intentions humans hold in common.
These cultural practices existed before many humans are born and yet they are subject
to them and indeed cultural norms are transmitted intergenerationally through social
learning.55 So too something similar will have to occur or be simulated for AGI.
Lon Fuller presaged the contemporary research in psychology and anthropology in
a way that is relevant to the question of AGI legal agency. He states the relationship of
human agency to the law as follows:
To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man
is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and
following rules, and answerable for his defaults.56
The question is, to Fuller, whether a person subject to the law “is, or can meaningfully
strive to become, a responsible, self-determining center of action.”57 Reading the relevant passages in Chapter 4 of Fuller’s The Morality of Law informs us that he was
responding to the behaviorism of his time, most notably that of psychologist B.F. Skinner, for whom intentionality and related aspects of cognition were black boxes not to
be explored.58 Beyond our scope here is an exploration how Fuller’s principle of selfdetermination does or does not reflect some form of intentionality. The point here is
limited: that some “traditional” or non-naturalist legal philosophy may have something
to tell us about who can be law’s subjects.
Continuing on from Fuller’s responsible agent condition with a more traditional
philosophical approach, we can examine the question of extending law’s rights and
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liabilities to AGI through the lens of good old-fashioned moral philosophy about justification of the law. How might we justify the extension of the law of contract to AGIs?
Justification of this kind involves investigating two relationships: (1) the relationship
of the law, a social institution backed by the coercive power of the state, to bearers of
its legal rights, duties, and obligations and (2) the relationship the law establishes between persons.59 At least from a human perspective, we can rely on a contractualist
approach, developed by T.M. Scanlon and others:60 do humans have reasons to reject
an AGI as having the status of a contract party, generally as a matter of principle and
not specific to any transaction? AGIs may also deserve the same question to be answered if we are amenable to a level of abstraction that permits us to consider whether
they are responsible agents who are capable of desert, blame, and other attributes associated with how the normative structure of the law has authority to regulate the persons
it governs.61
We will likely reach the same conclusion by the philosophical route that we have
reached by the anthropological and psychological route. If we want to justify the application of the law as it has been constructed by and for humans to AGI, then we need to
develop AI with human-like values and dispositions – with human-like cognitive architecture or that at least simulates it with the ability to interact with humans, otherwise
humans can reasonably reject the move. We need AI to have these qualities to be able
to enter into and perform contracts with humans. A relationally focused cognitive architecture for exchange relationships with humans and for AGI to be recognizable –
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subject to or eligible for - recognition by the law, is necessary. Contract law exists to
meet human needs in human societies for voluntary exchange. A sufficient level of
mutuality in terms of autonomy, interaction, autonomy, and adaptability62 would seem
to be necessary for the extension of contract rights and liabilities to AGI to survive the
test of reasonable rejection. Otherwise cooperation with humans will fail. Worse, an
alien system of AGI values and cognitive abilities, based on norms humans do not understand and cannot reasonably accept, may be considered by humans to be harmful or
pernicious, or may cause harm to humans.
What would be the properties of collective intentionality or responsible agency relevant to contracting by AGI? We can make a start on answering this question here,
though more AI research would need to be done. AGI will need to have a cognitive
architecture of voluntary exchange, understood within a social context of cooperation
within groups. It would not be pure self-interest as understood in rational choice theory,
long since discredited by advances in anthropology, psychology, and economics itself.63 In Pascal Boyer’s words: “Humans area immensely cooperative.”64 Tomasello
explains, based in his many years of anthropological work, that humans differ from
other apes because we are “group-minded.”65 Humans have only recently separated
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economic exchange from other social aspects of interaction.66 An AGI would have to
have the cognitive architecture associated with the psychology of transacting and exchange, set within the broader social context of how transacting and exchange connects
to group identification. Self-interest would have to be represented in this architecture,
but self-interest alone will be insufficient.
In the context of contracting and market transactions, AGI cognition will have to
take on the first, second, and third person standpoints. It would have to recognize and
consider in an appropriate way its own interests (first personal) and the interest of others
on an individual-by-individual basis (second personal). It will have to be able to represent the world objectively (third personal), to possess cognitive skills to process information about the world abstractly, as what Tomasello characterizes as “transpersonally,” in an agent-neutral way. 67 This third person perspective connects to the objective
theory of contract because it includes the ability to process information beyond one’s
own particulars.
An AGI capable of contracting would have to have the ability to compare utilities
at least at the level of the average human. AGIs must be able to measure respective
utilities to be able to infer that gaining one thing is worth losing another.68 They would
have to have cognitive capacity to represent ownership cognitively, in terms of knowing
what it owns and what it does not own and what passage of title or ownership means.
An AGI would have to develop free rider and cheater detection capabilities.
Leda Cosmides has done experimental research on how humans have evolved and
their specialized cognitive capacities to process information in the format of “benefit
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received, cost not paid.”69 Cosmides and Tooby have researched how human cognition
has an evolved specialization for deontic reasoning about social exchange between humans, which may be understood as a form of actually bargained for exchange between
humans in the same social group, which can be broadly defined.70 The cognitive architecture for social exchange reliably produces cooperation for mutual benefit between
two agents. When the mind registers a situation in the form of a conditional rule, such
as: “if X accepts a benefit from Y, it triggers an expectation that at some point that X
will have to confer a benefit on Y,” a social exchange relationship has been activated.71
In these contexts, the human mind will apply deontic concepts of obligation and entitlement.72
Not all social exchanges will qualify as contracts under the law enforceable by the
state. Moreover, market transactions themselves may differ from paradigmatic social
exchange. But it is worth understanding social exchange because it serves as a basic
template for transacting in goods and services.73 The point here is basic: humans have
just this cognitive structure connecting to transacting and agreeing and hence how contract law operates, and if AGIs are to participate in the social practices of contracts
enforceable by law, they will have to share a similar cognitive structure with humans.
Cognitive capacities associated with obligation and entitlement not only connect to
contract formation but to contract performance. To be able to transact in a contractual
context, an entity must have the ability to detect cheaters and free riding. 74 The
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underlying cognitive structure associated with opprobrium for cheating is as a conditional rule violation.75 It is telling that accidental rule violations will not fully engage
cheater detection cognition in humans, but international cheating certainly will.76 While
contractual liability is strict liability, fraud or misrepresentation liability is not in the
main legal systems of the world and usually requires some form of proof of intent to
defraud or deceive.77
Another set of cognitive capacities that will have relevance to contracting are those
that relate to what is known in the psychological literature as pro-sociality.78 Prosocial
behavior informs us that reciprocity probably has a great deal of relevance to how human contractors understand bargained for exchange and deviations from contract performance requirements.
Finally, a cognitive architecture for engaging in repeat transactions would be necessary.79 This would require the ability to recognize and act upon trust, reputation, and
tit-for-tat.80 Human cooperation in repeat transactions is a well-understood evolutionary
stable strategy for humans.
We cannot provide a full design specification for AGI as a contracting party here.
This article only serves to identify some important parameters for determining what
might be needed for an AGI to be a competent contracting party. Some questions remain
unanswered. An important set of questions have to do with whether to code AGI for
human biases such as loss aversion or other biases that may provide us with a more
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negative framework for understanding how humans do not always act in ways that increase their welfare.81 Should we program or mimic “disability” into an AGI so it will
not be able to out-negotiate a human in the contracting sphere or have some strategic
advantage as a result of superior cognitive abilities? As Bostrom explains in the context
of ethics, “to the extent that ethics is a cognitive pursuit, a superintelligence could do it
better than human thinkers.”82 Moreover, what if AGIs could someday produce other
AGIs on their own, which could surpass human capabilities in transactional contexts?
These are hard questions to answer about whether AGI will pose a “threat” to humanity
and beyond our scope here.
Of course, how an AGI would come to obtain legal rights and liabilities as a matter
of law is a different question. It would need some form of explicit statutory or other
legal recognition, with perhaps some built in protections such as insurance or escrow
requirements for assets.83 These questions are about the conventional legal pragmatics
once we have established that an AGI can qualify as a contracting party.84 Legal systems have been down this route before, with the recognition of corporate legal personality. They will do it again.

CONCLUSION
The work of understanding the role of AI in contracting is at its very beginning
stages. While limited domain forms of AI are currently deployed in smart contracting,
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the potential for expanding AI engagement in contracting and commercial transactions
will come with technological advances in AI. AGIs do not yet exist, but we must think
now about how they will interact with humans when they do come to exist. Law is one
of the most important normative domains for humans. If AGIs should have some form
of legal agency in the world of commerce and exchange, law could impose a significant
constraint on how their cognition and resulting behavior should operate in the world.
In the context of investing AGI with the capacity to contract, contract law itself will
face few problems in recognizing AGI as a contracting party, if AGI has the cognitive
machinery by which to engage in contract relationships with humans. AGI will need to
be able to interact and value in a way that is compatible to contract law’s principles.
These principles and the values they express are human values.85 Arguments that AGI
can have different motivations and psychologies86 than humans seem impractical unless
we want AGIs to have their own moral and political communities segregated from human ones, an approach prone to produce inter-group conflict. While AGI may be in the
far future now, it will be far more practical to align their cognition to contract law and
the values it represents than to change contract law and the humans who invented it.
Significant work remains to be done.
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